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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Morris timely appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition. On Morris argues the district court erred 
it that there was not a genuine of material regarding Mr. 
claim his defense counsel provided him with ineffective 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Morris was charged, by Information, with 
possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, resisting 
obstructing law enforcement, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.106.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Morris pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance and the persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.106.) He also waived his 
right to appeal his sentence and conviction. (R., p.53.) In return, the State agreed to 
dismiss the remaining charges and recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with 
five years fixed. (R., p.106.) Mr. Morris also entered into another agreement 
(hereinafter, terms of cooperation) with the State where he agreed to cooperate with law 
enforcement as a confidential informant and, in return, the State would recommend 
probation. (R., pp.106, 117.) 
After agreeing to cooperate with the police, Mr. Morris' girlfriend gave birth to a 
girl. (R., p.107.) Mr. Morris' baby tested positive for methamphetamine and Mr. Morris 
became part of a Child Protective Act (hereinafter, CPA) case pursuant to I.C. § 16-
1601, et seq. (R., p.107.) The attorney that represented Mr. Morris in the criminal case 
also represented Mr. Morris in the CPA case. (R., p.107.) 
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The baby was initially taken into the custody of the Department of Health and 
Welfare. (R., p.106.) Mr. Morris and his girlfriend were eventually given custody of the 
baby, but Mr. Morris was told he would lose custody and violate a court order1 if he 
with anyone using drugs or positive for any drugs. (02/08/11 Tr., p.9, 
Ls.20-25, p.18, L.24 - p. 19, L.18, p.26, L.22 - L.23.) That same order also 
precluded Mr. Morris from engaging in any illegal activity and using drugs. (38678 
Supp. R., pp.29-31 ;2 Request that the Court Take Judicial Notice, pp.4-7.)3 However, in 
the original pre-trial settlement agreement Mr. Morris also agreed that he would not 
violate any court order. (R., p.53.) As such, Mr. Morris would have to violate a court 
order in order to adhere to the terms of cooperation, which would simultaneously 
function as a breach of the pre-trial settlement agreement. (05/18/12 Tr., p.19, L.9 -
p.20, L.13; 02/08/11 Tr., p.26, L.22 - p.27, L.23.) Mr. Morris contacted his trial counsel, 
on September 30, 2010, approximately two months before sentencing and asked his 
trial counsel to speak with the State about the conflict between the court orders in the 
CPA case and the terms of cooperation (38678 Supp. R., pp.139-140.) However, trial 
counsel never contacted the State. (R., p.13.) Putting his daughter first, Mr. Morris did 
not cooperate as a confidential informant. (11/29/10 Tr., p.40, Ls.3-12; 02/08/11 
Tr., p.26, L.22 - p.27, L.23.) 
Prior to sentencing, the State provided additional sentencing materials, which 
consisted of a letter written by Sergeant O'Dell, who was Mr. Morris' contact with law 
1 That court order was issued in the CPA case. (R., p.12.) 
2 This citation appears in the record in the underlying criminal case and the district court 
took judicial notice of the entire criminal case at the hearing on the motion for summary 
dismissal. (05/18/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.4-23.) 
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enforcement. (38678 R - Additional Plaintiff's Sentencing Materials, pp.1-4.) In that 
O'Dell rebuked Mr. Morris for his failure to cooperate as a confidential 
informant. (38678 R - Additional Plaintiff's Sentencing Materials, pp.1-4.) 
As a preliminary sentencing matter, Mr. Morris formally requested the district 
court to take judicial notice of materials from the CPA case pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 201. (11/29/'10 Tr., p.8, L.23 - p.9, L.3; R., p.123.) The district court asked 
Mr. Morris' counsel whether the CPA case was sealed and defense counsel 
could not answer that question.4 (11/29/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-17.) The district couri 
denied Mr. Morris' motion for the court to take judicial notice, "finding that those records 
were sealed." (R., ·108.) 
After proceeding to sentencing, a Court Appointed Special Advocate (hereinafter, 
CASA) that was involved in the CPA case testified that Mr. Morris had made significant 
progress in the months prior to the sentencing hearing in order to regain custody of his 
daughter. (R., p.108.) In fact, the CASA testified that she was "amazed" at the 
progress Mr. Morris had made in such a short period of time. (11/29/10 Tr., p.22, L.1 -
p.23, Ls.4-21.) Mr. Morris then stated as follows: 
When I [saw] that little baby ... at the hospital and they took her away, it 
killed me. I know I didn't follow what the state asked [me] to do with 
regarding stuff, I'm in a catch 22. 
If I do what they want me to do, it interferes with my family, but 
that's what I have to do to keep my daughter. I can't associate with 
people that do dope. I don't want to associate with people that do dope. 
It's the first time. I can't explain what happened inside me, nor do I want 
to. I'm happy with it. I'm comfortable. It's not going to be a struggle to 
3 The Request that the Court Take judicial Notice is currently not in the record on 
appeal. Accordingly a motion to augment has been filed concurrently with this brief. 
4 As mentioned above, Mr. Morris' defense counsel represented him in both the criminal 
case and the CPA case. (R., p.107.) 
3 
stay clean. no option to me. I don't know how to explain it. 
mean, I'm not going to (inaudible) my daughter. 
(11/29/10 Tr., p.28, L.16 - p.29, L.5.) 
The prosecutor then argued, in aggravation, that Mr. Morris contacted Sergeant 
O'Dell to as a confidential informant. (11/29/10 Tr., p.34, L.23 -
p.11.) . Morris' alleged breach of the terms cooperation was the main reason 
State did not recommend probation. (11/29/10 , p.54, L.20 p.58, L.18.) Mr. Morris 
then c""'"'" to be placed on probation. ('11/29/10 Tr., p.41, L.20 - p.42, L.2.) However, 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with five years fixed. 
(R., 108.) It neither retained jurisdiction nor suspended the (R., p.108.) 
Mr. Morris filed a timely Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. (R., p.109.) A 
hearing was held on that motion where Sergeant O'Dell testified that after Mr. Morris' 
sentencing hearing he learned about the conflict between the orders in Mr. Morris' CPA 
case and the terms of cooperation. (02/08/11 Tr., p.14, L.17 - p.15, L.3.) Sergeant 
O'Dell was asked about the letter he wrote prior to sentencing and if he was aware at 
the time how Mr. Morris' cooperation as a confidential informant would affect the CPA 
case. (02/08/11 Tr., p.6, L.18 - p.9, L.9.) Sergeant O'Dell stated that he was not fully 
aware of the situation and went on to state: 
From the follow-up information I gathered regarding that, I don't think Larry 
explained himself very well to me at that time. 
After about a month . . . Larry had a baby. The baby was taken 
away. They were being supervised by Health & Welfare. And it turned 
out that if Larry testified positive for drugs again, the baby would be taken 
away again. He tried to explain to me that if he went back into the 
environment he was in before, he may have used. In essence, he told 
me: "I would rather keep my baby and take my chances at sentencing 
than go back into that environment, use drugs, and have the baby taken 
away." He really didn't explain it to me in those terms. But later I learned 
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that was potentially why he did not cooperate ... that's ... kind of a 
double edged sword. He could have also used that as leverage not to use 
again if he did cooperate by saying, "I can't use because my baby will be 
taken [away] if I do." 
(02/08/11 Tr., p.9, L.17 - p.10, L.12.) Sergeant O'Dell also testified t11at his letter 
omitted the fact that Mr. Morris volunteered "very useful information" pertaining to two 
armed robberies before he was charged in this matter.5 (02/08/11 Tr., p.77, L.22 -
p.78, L.15, p.102, Ls.2-8.) 
Mr. Morris testified at the Rule 35 hearing. When he was asked if he ever 
"worked" for Sergeant O'Dell, Mr. Morris stated that "I provided him information that I 
could at the time." (02/08/11 Tr., p.25, L.25 - p.26, L.1.) Mr. Morris did acknowledge 
that he did not provide any further services to Officer O'Dell because the baby was born 
and the CPA case quickly ensued. (02/08/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Morris also clarified 
that one of the reasons he did not further adhere to the terms of cooperation was the 
court order in the CPA case, which precluded him from performing his obligations under 
the agreement. (02/08/11 Tr., p.26, L.22 - p.27, L.23.) 
The district court observed that Mr. Morris provided Sergeant O'dell information 
"regarding robbery charges before his arrest in this matter and that's a significant factor 
to the Court because [it] certainly did not know about the agreement with law 
enforcement to act as an informant .... " (02/08/11 Tr., p.33, Ls.2-8.) The district court 
then stated that it had been under the impression at the sentencing hearing that 
Mr. Morris never intended to cooperate with the Sergeant Odell, but the new information 
5 The district court made a factual finding that this was new information. (02/08/11, 
Tr., p.101, Ls.11-16.) 
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changed its assessment of Mr. Morris' intent when he the terms of cooperation. 
(02/08/11 Tr., p.33, Ls.10-25.) The district court then ruled as follows: 
I'm going to modify the sentence in this case because it's hard to 
look back at a sentencing and say had I heard back at the sentencing 
about Mr. Morris having provided information to the police, not in 
for money or in a deal some lenient treatment on his own 
sentence, but just because he had some information and he wanted to 
give it to the it's hard to know what would I have given at 
the time. 
I firmly believe that the sentence would 
sentence. 
been a prison 
But whether I would have given him five fixed plus five indeterminate for 
ten had I known that Mr. Morris was not more or scamming the task 
force from the beginning, which I now believe not to be the case, it's hard 
to know what would have done. 
I think it's appropriate for the Court when the Court doesn't know 
the answer to certain questions to rule in favor of leniency toward the 
defendant .... 
(02/08/11 Tr., p.35, L.2 - p.36, L.3.) The district court then reduced Mr. Morris' sentence 
from a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, to a unified sentence of ten 
years, with four years fixed. (02/08/11 Tr., p.36, Ls.7-13.) Mr. Morris appealed from the 
district court's order partially granting his Rule 35 motion. (R., p.110.) The Idaho Court 
of Appeals affirmed the district court's orders. State v. Morris, 2013 Unpublished 
Opinion 312 (Ct. App. January 8, 2013). 
Mr. Morris timely filed a pro se petition and affidavit for post-conviction relief, 
wherein he made the following claims for relief: 
A. That his due process rights under the federal and state 
constitutions were violated because of (1) the insufficiency of the evidence 
and a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination; and (2) the 
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State's involuntary inducement of his guilty plea and breach of the 
agreement. 
B. That his right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the 
federal and state constitutions, was violated because of: (1) his attorney's 
failure to contact the prosecutor about the CPA case prior to sentencing; 
(2) his attorney's failure to request a continuance the sentencing 
hearing to remedy the bargain; (3) attorney's failure 
convincing argument for the district court to take judicial 
documents in the CPA (4) his attorney's failure to appeal his 
conviction; and (5) his attorney's failure to move to withdraw his guilty 
plea. 
(R, pp.4-17, 110.) 
Mr. Morris also the appointment of counsel to represent him during the 
post-conviction proceedings, which was by the district court. (R, pp.18-20, 
.) The filed a motion for summary dismissal of Mr. Morris' post-conviction 
petition. (R, pp.44-51.) Mr. Morris' post-conviction counsel filed a response to the 
State's motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.81-92.) The district court court held a 
hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal and then entered an order granting 
summary dismissal. (R., pp.100-130.) The court found that Mr. Morris' defense counsel 
was effective in regard to all of Mr. Morris claims. (R, pp.105-130.) However, the court 
did find that counsel was deficient in regard to the claim dealing with defense counsel's 
failure to provide a convincing argument for the criminal court to take judicial notice of 
the documents in the CPA case. (R., pp.105-130.) The court found that there was no 
prejudice because the criminal court was aware of the conflict between the CPA case 
and the terms of cooperation at the time of sentencing. (R., pp.124-125.) Mr. Morris 
timely appealed. (R., pp.134-136.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Morris' petition for post-conviction relief? 
8 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Morris' Petition For Post-Conviction 
I ntroc!uction 
district court found that Mr. Morris alleged a genuine issue of material 
on his assertion that trial counsel was deficient for his failure to "present a 
convincing argument for the [criminal] court to take judicial notice of the CPA case 
documents." (R., p.122.) However, it found that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact as to Mr. Morris' assertion that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient 
(R., p.124.) Specifically, the district court ultimately concluded the 
there were alternative sources of information before the criminal court at sentencing 
which obviated the need for the sentencing court to take judicial notice of the CPA case 
documents and, therefore, Mr. Morris would not have received a lesser sentence had 
the criminal court considered the CPA documents. (R., pp.124-125.) On appeal, 
Mr. Morris argues that the post-conviction court's conclusion was in error because it 
drew an inference in favor of the State to develop this conclusion, when that inference 
should have been made in favor of Mr. Morris, the non-moving party. 
B. Standard Of Review On Appeal 
In this case, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Morris's petition for post-
conviction relief. Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never 
involve the finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only 
determinations of law. Accordingly, this Court must review a district court's summary 
dismissal order de nova. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006). 
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C. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Morris' Post-Conviction 
Petition Because It Failed To Draw All Reasonable Inferences In Favor Of 
Mr. Morris 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is separate and 
distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction. 
Peltier v. 119 Idaho 456 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCPA), LC.§§ 19-4901 to -4911, 
and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456. Because it is a civil 
proceeding, the petitioner must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct App. 1995). However, the petition 
initiating a post-conviction proceeding differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. 
A post-conviction petition is required to include more than "a short and plain statement 
of the claim"; it "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of 
the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must 
be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not 
attached." Id.; I.C. § 19-4903. "In other words, the application must present or be 
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will 
be subject to dismissal." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Just as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment in other 
civil proceedings, the UPCPA allows for summary disposition of post-conviction 
petitions where there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and one party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.C. § 19-4906(c). "On review of a dismissal of 
a post-conviction application without an evidentiary hearing, [the court] must determine 
whether there are genuine issues of material fact." Jones v. State, 125 Idaho 294, 295 
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(Ct. App. 1994). An appellate court will "determine whether a genuine issue of fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with any 
affidavits." Id. "Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, 
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in 
favor of t11e non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). The district 
court need not accept those of the petitioner's allegations which are clearly disproved by 
the record. Coontz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368 (Ct. App. 1996) However, if a question 
of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to 
resolve that question. Sma//, 132 Idaho at 331. 
In this case, Mr. Morris has alleged ineffective assistance of counsel through his 
petition for post-conviction relief. The United States Constitution "guarantees a fair trial 
through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely 
through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). One such provision is the right to the assistance of counsel, 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
... have the assistance of counsel for his defense.")), which has been interpreted as 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-86. 
There is a two-pronged test for determining whether an attorney has rendered 
ineffective assistance in contravention of a criminal defendant's right to counsel. The 
threshold inquiry is whether counsel's performance was "deficient," i.e., whether it "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness," as judged "under prevailing 
professional norms." Id. at 687-91. Assuming there has been deficient performance, 
the next inquiry is whether that deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 
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687, 691-96. In order to establish "prejudice," it need not be shown "that counsel's 
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case" since the "result 
of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, 
even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to 
have determined the outcome." Id. at 693-94. Instead, it need only be shown "that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694 (emphasis added). 
In light of the foregoing standards, the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
Mr. Morris's petition in its entirety. The district court found that trial counsel was 
deficient for his failure to get the judge in the CPA case to unseal the documents in the 
CPA case for the purpose of Mr. Morris' sentencing hearing in the criminal case. 
(R., pp.122-123.) However, the district couti employed the following logic when it 
concluded that Mr. Morris could not prove that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
deficiency: 
[Mr. Morris] has not alleged a genuine issue of material fact that, if 
resolved in his favor, shows that he suffered prejudice as a result of 
counsel's failure to present a convincing argument to the court for it to 
consider the C.P.A. case documents. At sentencing, a Court Appointed 
Special Advocate ("C.A.S.A."), assigned to the C.P.A. case involving 
[Mr. Morris'] daughter, testified very positively for [Mr. Morris]. The 
C.A.S.A testified the [Mr. Morris] had been complying with the 
requirements of the C.P.A. case, including providing negative urine 
analysis samples. Thus, the court was able to consider [Mr. Morris'] 
performance in the C.P.A. case. and could infer that [Mr. Morris'] desire to 
meet every condition of that program had hindered his ability to cooperate 
with the task force. The C.A.S.A.'s testimony actually portrayed [Mr. 
Morris'] participation in the C.P.A. case in a more positive light than did the 
documents [Mr. Morris] sought the court to consider. 
Furthermore, the court indicated at the hearing on [Mr. Morris'] Rule 
35 motion that probation "was simply not in the cards for Mr. Morris" at the 
time of sentencing. Even after considering Mr. Odell's testimony in which 
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he indicated that [Mr. Morris] had come to him and explained that he could 
not cooperate with the task force because in doing so might cause him to 
use drugs and would prevent him from gaining custody over his daughter, 
the court declined to suspend [Mr. Morris'] and order probation, 
stating that "it would be diminishing [Mr. Morris'] criminal history. Thus, 
Mr. Morris would not have received a lesser sentence even if the court 
had considered the C.P.A. documents. Accordingly, Morris] has 
failed to allege a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was prejudiced by 
his attorney's failure to present convincing argument to the court regarding 
consideration of the C.P.A. case documents. 
, pp.124-125.) 
Mr. Morris argues that, the district court's observation that the sentencing court 
could infer that Mr. Morris' would have cooperated but for the CPA case was itself an 
inference. The district court when it drew this inference in favor of the State 
because all reasonable inferences are to be construed in favor of the non-moving party. 
Vavold, 148 Idaho at 45. Since the State moved for summary dismissal (R., pp.44-52), 
this inference should have been drawn in favor of Mr. Morris. 
Additionally, the CASA's testimony did not indicate that the court orders in the 
CPA case precluded Mr. Morris' from performing his obligations in the terms of 
cooperation. In Mr. Morris' post-conviction petition, he indicated that one of the terms of 
his plea agreement required him to adhere to all court orders. (R., pp.10-12.) In fact, 
the State would no longer be bound to the negotiated sentencing recommendations in 
the event Mr. Morris "violates any Court order .... " (R., p.53.) The CPA court ordered 
Mr. Morris to adhere to the case plan in the CPA case. (R., p.12; Request that the 
Court Take Judicial Notice, pp.1-7.) The terms of the case plan in the CPA case 
"hindered [Mr. Morris'] ability to cooperate with the task force." (R., p.124.) Mr. Morris' 
post-conviction claim was not that the criminal court was unaware of the fact the CPA 
case made it difficult to adhere to the terms of cooperation, it was that by adhering to 
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the terms of cooperation he would have been violating a court order in the CPA case, 
which would trigger a breach of the term in the plea that required him to 
adhere to all court orders. This distinction is important, because the CASA's testimony 
at sentencing did not convey this specific problem. testified that was 
apprehensive about Mr. Morris having protective supervision over his 
(11/29/10 Tr., p.23, Ls.4-10.) She went on to testify that Mr. Morris' UA's were all 
negative, that he enrolled at the Port of Hope in intensive outpatient therapy, and he 
was making it to all of his appointments. (11/29/10 Tr., p.23, Ls.11-21.) Based on that 
limited information, the district court would not have inferred that Mr. Morris would be 
violating a court order if he adhered to the terms of cooperation, which would function 
as a breach of the agreement. In fact, the sentencing court never made any 
references as to this specific issue at the Rule 35 hearing. (02/08/11 Tr., p.32, L.23 -
p.36, L.23.) Thus, not only did the post-conviction court err by drawing an inference in 
favor of the State, but that inference was also unreasonable as it is not supported by the 
record. 
As a final note, the State will likely argue that there is no prejudice based on the 
district court's representations at the Rule 35 hearing that it never had any intention of 
placing Mr. Morris on probation. (02/08/11 Tr., p.35, Ls.11-20.) However, the question 
is not whether Mr. Morris could prove actual prejudice; instead the question is whether 
there is a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's deficient performance the 
outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Since the standard is based on 
reasonableness, it must be an objective standard and the record indicates that a 
reasonable judge would have done something different had the CPA documents been 
14 
the criminal court at sentencing. The following comments made by the post-
conviction court support this conclusion: 
I'm sympathetic to Mr. Morris. It sounds as if he turned over a new leaf 
when his daughter was born, and I can understand why he would not have 
wanted to participate in the child protective action or not wanted to 
participate in the deal that he struck with the criminal authorities to 
participate in monitored buys of drugs, but that was his call, not the State's 
call. [The] State lived up its bargain. Mr. Morris [pleaded] guilty. 
[BJecuase Mr. Morris' child was born, he doesn't want to do what he has 
agreed to do, and I don't quarrel with that .... 
I have problems with finding fault with anything that transpired below or in 
front of Judge Haynes. I might not have done the same thing. I ... can't 
that I would've done what Judge Hanyes did .... 
(05/18/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.2-21.) According to the post-conviction court's own statements, 
it probably would not have done the same thing as the sentencing court. Since the 
post-conviction court concluded that it would not have done the same thing as the 
sentencing court, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the prejudice caused by 
his trial counsel's failure to get the CPA documents into the criminal record. 
In sum, the district court found that trial counsel was deficient for failing to 
provide a convincing argument in support of his motion for the sentencing court to take 
judicial notice of the documents from the CPA case. Mr. Morris was prejudiced by this 
action because the sentencing court never fully understood the true nature of the 
conflict between the court orders in the CPA case and the obligations continued in 
terms of cooperation. The district court erred because it inferred that the criminal court 
was aware of the full extent the CPA case made it impossible for Mr. Morris to adhere to 
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terms of cooperation. According to the district court though, it would not have done 
same thing as the sentencing court. As such, there is a genuine of material 
as to the question of whether Morris was prejudiced by his trial counsel's 
performance because a reasonable court would not have taken the same 
as the sentencing court had the documents from the CPA case been admitted in 
criminal case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Morris respectfully requests that this case be remanded for further 
DATED this 14th day of May, 20·13. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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